Two things were obvious at Wednesday morning’s Supreme Court argument in Louisiana v. Callais, a case asking the Court to abolish longstanding safeguards against racially gerrymandered legislative maps.

The first thing is that the Court will split along party lines, with all six Republicans voting to destroy the federal Voting Rights Act’s (VRA) restrictions on racial gerrymandering, and all three Democrats in dissent. The other thing is that there is no consensus among the Republicans about how they should write an opinion gutting these protections.

While all six Republican justices almost certainly walked into Wednesday’s argument with a particular result in mind, they had wildly divergent theories of how to get there.

Liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayor torched the Supreme Court for siding with Trump on birthright citizenship—and putting every civil right under attack.

In a major win for Donald Trump’s immigration agenda, the Supreme Court on Friday allowed his administration to revoke humanitarian parole protections for over half a million migrants, opening the door to possible deportation for nearly 1 million people.

The article says it all. SCOTUS is no longer an arbiter of the law. They are an arm of the MAGA movement.

The decision is another massive blow to the separation of powers.

Excerpt

During her questioning, Kagan not only pressed Sauer about the practicality of that position, but also about whether the Trump administration would commit to following a court order within the circuit it was issued. Sauer would not make such a commitment, either to Kagan or to Barrett.

In response to Barrett’s question, Sauer answered, “Our general practice is to respect those precedents, but there are circumstances when it is not a categorical practice.”

A shocked-sounding Barrett exclaimed, “this administration’s practice or the long-standing practice of the federal government?”

“As I understand it, long-standing policy of the Department of Justice,” came Sauer’s response.

“Really?” snapped Barrett.

Sauer stuck to his position, but began to drift by indicating that government refusal to follow court orders was a policy amorphously communicated to him.

“Yes, as it was phrased to me, we generally respect circuit precedent, but not necessarily in every case,” Sauer offered, then went on to suggest that pending litigation would somehow neutralize any requirement to follow judicial orders. “Some examples might be a situation where we are litigating to get that circuit precedent overruled and so on.”

Barrett tried again, clarifying to Sauer that she was not talking about a situation in which the government is embroiled in litigation to overturn a decades-old outdated precedent.

“I’m talking about in this kind of situation,” Barrett hypothesized. “I’m talking about this week, the 2nd Circuit holds that an executive order is unconstitutional, and then what do you do the next day or the next week?”

“Generally, we follow it,” replied Sauer, emphasizing the word “generally.”

“So you’re still saying generally?” argued Barrett.

“Yes,” said Sauer.

“And you still think that it’s generally the long-standing policy of the federal government to take that approach?” asked a clearly unconvinced Barrett.

Sauer would not budge, answering again, “generally.”